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An Incentive-compatible Energy Trading Framework for Neighborhood Area Networks with Shared Energy Storage

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Document pages: 10 pages

Abstract: Here, a novel energy trading system is proposed for demand-side management ofa neighborhood area network (NAN) consisting of a shared energy storage (SES)provider, users with non-dispatchable energy generation, and an electricityretailer. In a leader-follower Stackelberg game, the SES provider firstmaximizes their revenue by setting a price signal and trading energy with thegrid. Then, by following the SES provider s actions, the retailer minimizessocial cost for the users, i.e., the sum of the total users cost when theyinteract with the SES and the total cost for supplying grid energy to theusers. A pricing strategy, which incorporates mechanism design, is proposed tomake the system incentive-compatible by rewarding users who disclose trueenergy usage information. A unique Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved wherethe SES provider s revenue is maximized and the user-level social cost isminimized, which also rewards the retailer. A case study with realistic energydemand and generation data demonstrates 28 ~-~45 peak demand reduction ofthe NAN, depending on the number of participating users, compared to a systemwithout SES. Simulation results confirm that the retailer can also benefitfinancially, in addition to the SES provider and the users.

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