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Mechanism Design for Efficient Online and Offline Allocation of Electric Vehicles to Charging Stations

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Document pages: 25 pages

Abstract: We study the problem of allocating Electric Vehicles (EVs) to chargingstations and scheduling their charging. We develop offline and online solutionsthat treat EV users as self-interested agents that aim to maximise their profitand minimise the impact on their schedule. We formulate the problem of theoptimal EV to charging station allocation as a Mixed Integer Programming (MIP)one and we propose two pricing mechanisms: A fixed-price one, and another thatis based on the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Later, wedevelop online solutions that incrementally call the MIP-based algorithm. Weempirically evaluate our mechanisms and we observe that both scale well.Moreover, the VCG mechanism services on average $1.5 $ more EVs than thefixed-price one. In addition, when the stations get congested, VCG leads tohigher prices for the EVs and higher profit for the stations, but lower utilityfor the EVs. However, we theoretically prove that the VCG mechanism guaranteestruthful reporting of the EVs preferences. In contrast, the fixed-price one isvulnerable to agents strategic behaviour as non-truthful EVs can charge inplace of truthful ones. Finally, we observe that the online algorithms are onaverage at $98 $ of the optimal in EV satisfaction.

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