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Modelling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks

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Document pages: 30 pages

Abstract: Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in gaspipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function form (CFF).This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines fall under regulatedthird party access (TPA). TPA, which is by now the norm in the EU, obliges theowner of a pipeline to transport gas for others, provided they pay a regulatedtransport fee. From a game theoretic perspective, this institutional settingcreates so called "externalities, " the description of which requires partitionfunction form (PFF) games. In this paper we propose a method to computepayoffs, reflecting the power structure, for a pipeline system with regulatedTPA. The method is based on an iterative flow mechanism to determine gas flowsand transport fees for individual players and uses the recursive core and theminimal claim function to convert the PPF game back into a CFF game, which canbe solved by standard methods. We illustrate the approach with a simplestylized numerical example of the gas network in Central Eastern Europe with afocus on Ukraine s power index as a major transit country.

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