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Document pages: 27 pages
Abstract: We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where thenetwork designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing theseeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networksfor the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on thesenetworks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles orvariants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery isconnected to a single node in the core.
Document pages: 27 pages
Abstract: We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where thenetwork designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing theseeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networksfor the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on thesenetworks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles orvariants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery isconnected to a single node in the core.