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A Weakly Renegotiation-Proof International Environmental Agreement with Altruism

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Document pages: 14 pages

Abstract: This study provides a new framework for international environmental agreements (IEAs) with full participation if each country has altruistic preference, using a repeated game. We assume that each country has two types of altruism: impartial altruism, where each country cares about other countries’ net benefits from greenhouse gas abatement, and community altruism, where participation country concerns only to coalition partners. We show that a full participation with low degree of altruisms is feasible if considered in a repeated game framework with punishment scheme. Additionally, altruisms function as a complementary device of punishment scheme for IEA. Our main results show that altruism can facilitate full participation in IEA, suggesting that they should be considered in climate change negotiations.

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