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Convex Combinatorial Auction of Pipeline Network Capacities

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Document pages: 31 pages

Abstract: In this paper we propose a mechanism for the allocation of pipelinecapacities, assuming that the participants bidding for capacities do havesubjective evaluation of various network routes. The proposed mechanism isbased on the concept of bidding for route-quantity pairs. Each participantdefines a limited number of routes and places multiple bids, corresponding tovarious quantities, on each of these routes. The proposed mechanism assigns aconvex combination of the submitted bids to each participant, thus its calledconvex combinatorial auction. The capacity payments in the proposed model aredetermined according to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves principle. We compare theefficiency of the proposed algorithm with a simplified model of the methodcurrently used for pipeline capacity allocation in the EU (simultaneousascending clock auction of pipeline capacities) via simulation, according tovarious measures, such as resulting utility of players, utilization of networkcapacities, total income of the auctioneer and fairness.

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