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Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences

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Document pages: 12 pages

Abstract: We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferencesover the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) toobtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using asimplifying assumption, we characterize all Pareto optimal allocations, whichhave a simple structure: are peak-preserving and non-wasteful. Finally, weprovide simple alternative mechanisms that Pareto dominate that of Wang-Wu, andwhich achieve envy-freeness or Pareto optimality.

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